An introduction to Part II in the light of the dissertation as a whole
In Chapter 1, Scripture as the inspired Word of God96 and the soul of theology97, together with sacred Tradition98 and the Magisterium of the Church99 proved to be a constant point of reference.
Starting from the mystery of the Blessed Trinity and taking into account philosophical concepts and the data of the bodily-person, we tried to perceive the structure of man's being as a whole and particularly in terms of the inclination to the action of procreation.
It is clear that the vocation to self-giving is not a supplementary vocation to the being of man; rather, the vocation to self-giving is a conscious participation in the nature of all created being to make itself known: to reveal what it is in what it does.
If Part I is a recognition that our questions are in relation to a complex and developing Christian anthropology, then Part II is a brief survey of the problems which constitute the 'negative' pole of our situation.
In the brief discussions which follow we hope to show how these things help us to clarify the relationship between a fact and a moral norm.
CHAPTER 2: The Naturalistic Fallacy
There are two quite different forms to the naturalistic fallacy.
David Hume's version is that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is'.
The problem posed by Hume appears throughout this dissertation.
It acts like an incision into human being and it is taken to ask how a fact is ordered to a moral norm.
We therefore prescind from the interesting questions as to whether and why this preoccupation with Hume is apparently a particular problem for 'English philosophers'100 or 'English philosophy'101.
The author of the second version of the naturalistic fallacy is George Moore.
He says that 'good' is indefinable.
It was not considered to be sufficiently relevant to the question to remain a part of the main body of this dissertation.
(i) Hume's Naturalistic Fallacy
In the discussion which leads up to Hume's fallacy he starts with the conclusion that all mental acts are perceptions102.
Building on a previous discussion he also says: 'Morals ... produce or prevent actions.
Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular.
The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason'.
For reason is inactive in itself103.
Reason discovers between one fact and another, either a truth by recognizing an agreement, or a falsehood by a disagreement.
However, if 'passions, volitions, and actions' are original, incomparable facts, then it is beyond the power of reason to determine their truth or falsity104.
Hume later says: 'So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it'105.
He then concludes: 'Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind'106.
David Hume then formulates the Naturalistic fallacy: that the relationship between an is and an ought is a new relation and 'how [can] this new relation ... be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it'107.
(ii) An evaluation of Hume's fallacy
His definition of reason as not ordered to action makes it impossible to see how Hume's kind of reason can contribute to rational action of any kind, precisely because, if reason cannot direct the will, then the will is not so much a possession of the power of doing or not doing an action, but a vehicle of reactions to stimuli.
Morality, in the case of a vice, is a reaction of blame from the constitution of our nature; indeed, it is a perception, like sound is a 'perception', and not a quality in an object.
But just as the perception of sound is ordered to the transmission of sound, so the perception of vice is ordered to what stimulates that perception.
In other words, perceptions are not 'just in the mind'.
So Hume gratuitously denies the very relationship between an external object and the mind which perception would entail, even the perception of a colour.
&nsbp;For if colour does not exist as the quality of an object then neither does it exist to be perceived by the mind.
It is against this background that we see that Hume asserts another denial: an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is'; indeed, in so far as it can mean anything, it is a fallacy of uniformity: the presupposition that there is no distinction in human being between a sense reaction and the generation of a moral norm.
His fallacy, then, is a kind of symbolic expression of his anthropological dislocation of reason and action.
For, Thomistically, moral action (what 'ought' to be) pertains to realizing the potential goal, through the use of reason, of a good that exists (what 'is').
But if we cannot know what exists because perception is a reaction, paradoxically, to an unknowable stimulus, and we cannot act on the basis of what we know because reason is not ordered to action, then the divorce between action and reason is really an expression of a divorced reason and reality: an inability to see, through the use of reason, both an existent good, such as the complementarity of husband and wife, and the natural goals of union and the possibility of procreation, which are as inseparable from that existent good as the light from the sun that emits it.
However, even if Hume is making an assertion about the identity of physical and moral 'reactions', based as it is on a dislocated relationship between reason and action, we can nevertheless take up the question that he poses.
For his question would appear to find an echo in the modern mind and precisely in the terms of the relationship of morality to a physical fact.
Given the difference between a physiological process and a moral norm, what account of human being will establish the precise relationship between the physiological cycle of fertility and infertility, and the generation of a moral norm?
(iii) A sample of references to Hume's Naturalistic Fallacy
Hume's version of the naturalistic fallacy is that we cannot, either directly or validly108, derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.
This observation is a central concern.
In so far as it has been addressed explicitly by numerous authors, it is cited as a problem for moral theology generally.
It has been either a criterion for the criticism of Humanae vitae or a solution to it is written into an account of our moral thinking; indeed, whether in discussions on St. Thomas Aquinas109 or in a definition of the natural law110, both are sometimes referred to by saying that they exist or can be defended in a form which does not commit this fallacy.
In the following sample, a variety of authors refer in one way or another to Hume's Naturalistic Fallacy and the problem it presents for moral theology.
Josef Fuchs says: 'Reason ... can speak a word which becomes for us a moral standard of measure, but in order to do this it absolutely must listen to the word of nature'; and then he begins the next paragraph saying: 'The word of nature speaks to us always and only about facts'111.
In a slightly more adapted comment, Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw point out: 'that God commands us to act in accord with nature.... is only another fact; it tells us nothing about why we ought to obey God'112.
K. H. Peschke, in his own work, concludes: 'From the existing reality of nature alone no final conclusions can be drawn with regard to man's moral obligations.
The additional criterion of the ultimate end is required to gain these conclusions'113.
B. Haring observes: 'The ... problem for ethics is how we can make the transition from nature as givenness to nature as ethical norm'114; and shortly after: 'We cannot jump from biological givenness to ethical norms'115.
T. Kennedy says: 'The main objection to natural law is that it falls prey to the "is-ought" fallacy deriving these principles as "oughts" from the facts of human nature'116.
Similarly, F. Bockle states: 'the pattern of a person's sexual behaviour is being primarily interpreted from the biological aspect and is being made dependent on this'117.
Another way of putting this is to say that the natural function of a thing is understood to be equivalent to the right moral use of it.
C. E. Curran explains this in the following way: '"Physicalism" ... tends to identify the moral action with the physical and biological structure of the act'118: as if a physical and biological structure of the act can somehow exist without reference to the 'personal aspects of the sexual union'119.
In other words, the accusation of 'physicalism' implies a dissociation between a personal and physical meaning, as if the morality of the marital act is not an expression of an inseparably physical-personal act.
Conversely, in what sense is the marital act a unitary act of different dimensions: a single act which is both physical and personal?
In general these different authors tend to view a fact as possessing non-moral but relevant information concerning a moral action.
This gives rise to the possibility that here is the problem.
On the one hand there is factual information and on the other hand there is the use of reason and the development of moral norms.
This starts to suggest a kind of dualism.
For even if God is admitted to be the Creator, as many if not all of these proponents do, it is difficult to determine what difference if any this makes to the general situation.
Grisez and Shaw even explain this, up to a point, in a quotation already given in paragraph two of this section: 'that God commands us to act in accord with nature ... is only another fact; it tells us nothing about why we ought to obey God.'
In the following excerpts from Papal and Magisterial documents, there emerges another dimension of complexity in the relationship of a fact to a norm.
The particular objection to Humanae vitae which invokes the philosophical problem raised by David Hume, takes the form of an assertion that Humanae Vitae and other Magisterial documents are biologistic.
It is summarised in Veritatis Splendor in the following way: 'the traditional conception of the natural law ... is accused of presenting as moral laws what are in themselves mere biological laws'120.
The problem which Hume raised was that a fact is so different from a moral principle that the one can neither 'entail nor be derived from the other'121.
It is a general distinction that the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith appears to uphold: 'facts do not furnish a rule for judging the morality of human acts'122.
This statement arises in opposition to the suggestion that the statistical prevalence of behaviour could be a criterion for determining whether or not it is moral.
It cites Pope Paul VI: 'the conclusions drawn from such surveys could not of themselves provide criteria for determining truth'123.
What is clear is that a statistical number of immoral actions is not morally normative and does not, in that sense, lead to a truth.
An immoral action does not become a moral action simply because it is a statistical fact: a numerically common behaviour in a particular society or even globally.
It does not follow from this, however, that it is always true that 'facts do not furnish a rule for judging the morality of human acts.'
What about the normative fact that follows on the creative action of God: "human life is sacred - all men must recognize that fact, Our Predecessor, Pope John XXIII, recalled, 'since from its first beginnings it calls for the creative action of God'"124?
It would therefore appear that there is a distinction between two kinds of facts.
The principle enunciated by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith would only apply as a general rule to the statistical type of fact, and even then to the attempt, in particular, to draw an inference from statistical facts in contradiction to a moral norm.
A further confirmation of this complexity in the relationship of fact to moral norm would appear to come from Pope John Paul II.
In the citation with which we started out, he says: 'the traditional conception of the natural law ... is accused of presenting as moral laws what are in themselves mere biological laws'125.
Pope John Paul II gives an answer to this when he says we refer to these inclinations 'in order to find in them rational indications with regard to the order of morality'126.
Either because they outline the general problem or because they point up a particular aspect of it, this sample of references gives us an introduction to the following section.
They have highlighted that the fact-norm problem is one fundamental to understanding how the morality of an act, does in some way relate to our human nature.
Our problem is also beginning to show a certain complexity.
We will take up and discuss a particular solution to the fact-norm problem and then, in the subsequent section, discuss an alternative to it that takes up this question of a normative fact.
(iv) A thematic response to Hume's Fallacy: the first act of practical reasoning.
It would appear that both Germain Grisez and John Finnis127, the latter128 after the former, pose a solution to the problem of this dissertation which leaves no question to be answered.
Douglas Flippen says that Grisez appears to solve the problem of the relation of an 'is' to an 'ought'129 by advocating a conception of Thomistic practical reason in which the problem ceases to exist; he quotes Grisez in a footnote130: "And just as theoretical thought is by its very nature is-thinking, so practical thought is by its very nature ought-thinking"131.
Granted that when reason operates in relation to 'what is to be', this 'qualifies the very functioning of the mind' such that it operates as "directed to a work"132, it does not follow that in this there is no relationship of the reason to the natural inclination; and it is the natural inclination which stands as an instance of what 'is'.
There could be a question to answer as to whether the initial relationship of reason to natural inclination is an expression of reason as practical133 or reason as speculative134.
It is necessary to obtain the first principle of practical reason; and that obtaining this first principle implies some kind of relationship between natural inclinations and the first principle: 'good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided'135.
The very relationship of natural inclinations and first principle is indicative that moral obligation is rooted in good human inclinations and God given human nature136.
These human tendencies have to 'be grasped by practical reason along with the real goods toward which they incline the human person'137; and 'they function as dynamic sources of our cognitive knowledge'138.
The natural inclination as a 'given' is a part of the 'is' of human nature out of which the reasoning of practical reason proceeds.
Germain Grisez139 recognizes that practical reason reflects on the natural inclinations as to what provides the real range of possible human action.
He grants that level of the relationship between what 'is' and what practical reason needs to know.
John Finnis says: 'by a simple act of non-inferential understanding one grasps that the object of the inclination which one experiences is an instance of a general form of good, for oneself (and others like one)'140.
William May says that Grisez understands these initial principles, although grasped by reason: 'are not as yet moral principles'141.
At the same time these authors hold the view that the first principle of natural law, that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided, can be understood in such a way that '"Good" here means not only what is morally good but also whatever can be understood to be truly perfective of human persons, while "evil" or "bad" has the meaning of whatever deprives human persons of their perfection or fullness of being'142.
There appears to be a contradiction between two things.
On the one hand the first principle of practical reason 'means not only what is morally good'; and on the other hand this first principle of practical reason is 'not as yet' a moral principle.
What begins to emerge is this: trying to derive moral obligation from human nature appears to involve committing some form of logical fallacy.
Finnis has called the naturalistic fallacy a logical fallacy143; and Grisez, Boyle and Finnis explained this more fully when they say: 'the moral ought cannot be derived from the is of theoretical truth ... from a set of theoretical premises, one cannot logically derive any practical truth, since sound reasoning does not introduce what is not in the premises.
And the relationship of principles to conclusions is a logical one among propositions.
Therefore, the ultimate principles of morality cannot be theoretical truths of metaphysics and/or philosophical anthropology'144.
In other words, the crucial question is: what constitutes the premises of moral reasoning?
If 'sound reasoning does not introduce what is not in the premises', then either there is a moral content to the human nature which is grasped by reason, or reason supplies the moral form to what it otherwise grasps as the material to be morally moulded?
But what is the origin of the 'moral form' supplied by reason?
If reason does not supply a moral form, nor does a moral value come into this from a direct grasp of human nature, then how does the sole action of reason constitute a moral action?
So is a non-moral proposition the basis of moral reasoning145?
Or is the human nature which is grasped propositionally, grasped in such a way that what is grasped, is grasped moraIly: grasped as a potential to moral action?
(v) The possibility that a value is integral to facts
Henry Veatch says: 'facts may ... be so read and construed that values will be recognized as being no less than an integral part of them.
Likewise, that man's very nature can be seen and understood to involve certain inescapable and undeniable obligations that are integral to such a nature - this in no wise entails any unwarranted inference from "is" to "ought"'146.
In other words, what if the first principle of practical reason is a grasp of the inherent moral good to which human nature tends through human action?
If the first principle of moral reasoning is a moral principle, precisely because the nature that is grasped is a moral nature, then no logical fallacy has been committed.
Moral truth is developed out of what is in the premise; and what is in the premise is understood to be a direct grasp of the moral nature of man.
Josef Pieper also suggests something of this kind when he speaks of the 'obligatory quality of reality itself'147.
The rest of his remark, however, is inclusive of the obligation which follows on the truth of an idea; and so he indicates a relation of what 'is' to the truth and to what 'ought' to be.
He says: 'The greatest ideas, those that comprehensively reveal the truth of things, possess some of the obligatory quality of reality itself; they impose an actual coercion'148.
The integral human values that were encountered in the research for this dissertation all point to God as their Author and to God, therefore, as the 'guarantor' of these integral human values.
If the eternal law of God is holy, and the law of God is the regulatory principle embodied in unconscious human nature, then this is an ontological foundation of the free, moral choice to be personally holy and to consciously participate in the eternal law through natural law.
Pope Paul VI says: 'the Lord has entrusted to them [Christian husbands and wives] the task of making visible to men and women the holiness, and the joy too of the law which unites inseparably their love for one another and the co-operation they give to God's love, God who is the Author of human life'149.
Through the conscious, natural law participation in the eternal law, there is an actuation of a potential inherent in the very constitution of man being ordered to the eternal law.
Pope Paul VI also says: 'God the Creator, through specific laws, has built into it [an act of mutual love], ... his design which constitutes the norms of marriage, and ... [expresses] the will of the Author of life'150.
Similarly, man participates in the 'truth' of God because his very design as a whole and in every part, is an embodiment of a divine 'idea'.
The potential truthfulness of man is an 'objective effect' of the embodiment of a divine idea in the fact of Creation.
The Fathers of the Second Vatican Council say something of relevance to this: 'Truth can impose itself on the mind of man only in virtue of its own truth, which wins over the mind with both gentleness and power'151.
If one takes into consideration the truth instantiated in being, when 'natural things are called true in relation to God's Ideas of them'152, then it appears possible that the truth instantiated in an object can also 'win over the mind with gentleness and power'.
Similar again is the argument from the ontological good of a human being.
If God gives an irrevocable human good in the giving of human existence, a good which nevertheless requires the completion of graced good actions for its perfection, then what is this fundamental good of existence which is even named after the nature of God as The Good?
There is a meaning of 'good' which is a beginning as well as an end.
There is the meaning of the good of existence which follows on the fact of the action of God at our creation, even if that act is made subject to the consequences of original sin.
The very origin of human being, dependent as it is on the free action of God, gives to man the ontological good of his being.
The ontological good of human being is perfect as it proceeds from the action of God; however, the ontological good of human being is imperfect as it proceeds from the parents transmission of it by propagation of human 'life'.
The imperfection of human life as it is transmitted by our parents is a consequence of the transmission of original sin by propagation, which refers particularly and exclusively to the participation of man in the genesis of a new human being.
Referring back to the action of God, however, we can see the following.
In so far as an original good is retained in the very existence of things, as they originally followed an act of God at creation (Gn 1: 31), then to that extent even what is otherwise imperfect through original sin, nevertheless retains the good of its existence as given at creation153.
A reflection in the light of the dissertation as a whole
There are at least two ways of defining Hume's naturalistic fallacy.
The first is the fallacy of uniformity: there is no difference between physiological reactions and the generation of a moral action.
In the light of the dissertation as a whole this takes us to the relationship between an embodied, unconscious participation in the eternal law and a conscious, rational participation in the eternal law.
A second definition of the naturalistic fallacy is a logical definition: nothing is to be in the conclusion that is not in the premises.
Grisez, Finnis, Shaw, perhaps May and others, argue that a moral action is by definition an action made moral through the use of reason.
This is agreed but considered subject to an objection that arises out of a particular version of the relationship of human inclination to moral principle.
If there is a direct and non-speculative grasp of a non-moral good which then leads to a moral good through the exercise of reason, then it follows that this non-speculative grasp of a non-moral good is still a grasp of what is true.
It is this grasp of what is true, however it is put, that insists as it were on the relationship of human nature to human action: a relationship not just in terms of being to action, but of moral being to moral action.
Recalling the discussion in Part I of this dissertation, the perception of a true account of a human inclination, is to some extent the perception of the truth as a divine 'idea' embodied in that natural inclination.
So the acceptability of this account is subject to the proviso that the non-speculative grasp of a non-moral good is a true grasp of that non-moral good.
One otherwise accepts something of their distinction between the object of an action and a moral action: an action is made moral through the use of reason.
A complexity in this discussion is now crystallized by Humanae Vitae.
Pope Paul VI, building on Pope John XXIII, says: human life is sacred since, from its first beginnings, it calls for the creative action of God.
It is in accordance with this complexity that we see Henry Veatch, Josef Pieper and Pope John Paul II present a moral value as an integral part of a human fact.
In view of this, no argument based on a perception of an integral human value or a value inherent in created reality, can commit the fallacy of concluding to things which are not in the premises.
We have seen how the meaning of law as holy, both embodied in human design and expressed by reason, truth as an embodied divine idea, the good of existence as proceeding from the divine-human act of procreation, all contribute to defining anew the basic meaning of a human fact as complex.
A further helpful distinction is drawn from Andrew Beards' discussion on Hume:154 What 'is' can refer to integral human nature: the total fact of human being as a given prior to our investigation of it.
Such a use of what 'is' has to be distinguished from another reference to what is: what 'is' as a statement of truth155.
We already said a reference to an integral human value, determinative of but not identical to the moral action, is at the same time a recognition of the effect on human being of the action and design of God.
Pope Paul VI called human life sacred in view of this action of God.
So we are led to the fundamental question of the design of God as 'morally' normative.
The original design of God stands as act to the moral potential of man.
The action of God produces a normative design of human being that was so from the beginning (Mt 19: 4).
This 'given' exists as an existential complexity.
In view of Gaudium et Spes, the existential complexity of man is in the first place man as united to Christ at the incarnation156 157.
This meaning of what 'is' as the given of an existential, normative human nature (prescinding from the difficulties of stating this), is distinct from the meaning of what 'is' as a truth statement.
A moral action is ordered to what 'is' as a normative fact and to what 'is' as the truth concerning it.
If the term 'normative fact' appears to dissolve the distinction between fact and norm, this cannot be denied; however, it is a concept which echoes the Scripture when it says: 'God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them' (Gn 1: 27); and it echoes Pope Paul VI when he speaks of human life as sacred.
In contrast to what started out as an apparent polarity of the two positions that we examined in some detail, the discussion suggests that both are relevant to a complete account of the complex reality of the genesis of moral action.
Recalling the relationship of all this to a spirituality of being open to the possibility of life, we can say the following: the transformation of a potentiality in a created fact to an actual good action, perfective of the Christian person, is by knowing through the use of reason that an action is a truly good moral action because it objectively participates in the will of God for that person.
Finally, the very act of creation by God is proving to be fundamentally relevant to the whole sequence of fact to moral norm.
The relevance of this question of our origin, as we will see in the next Chapter, is further indicated by various kinds of dualism which bear on the relationship of fact to moral norm.
||Dei Verbum no. 11.
||Ibid. no. 24
||Ibid. no. 8.
||Ibid. no. 10.
||Henry B. Veatch, "Review of Natural Law and Natural Rights. By John Finnis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980", The American Journal of Jurisprudence 26 (1981) p. 257.
||Ibid. p. 259.
||David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, Second Edition, 1978) p 456.
||Ibid. p. 457.
||Ibid. p. 458.
||Ibid. p. 469.
||Ibid. p. 469.
||Ibid. p 469.
||G. Woodall recommended the insertion of both 'directly' and 'validly' (5/03/01).
||John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, reprinted 1999) pp. 34 and 47.
||J. Finnis, "natural law" , pp. 606-607 of The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, edited by Ted Honderlich, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
||Josef Fuchs, Christian Ethics in a Secular Arena, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1984) p. 95.
||G. Grisez and R. Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ: A Summary of Christian Moral Principles, (London/Notre Dame: University Of Notre Dame Press, 1991) p. 45.
||K. H. Peschke, Christian Ethics: Moral Theology in the Light of Vatican II: Vol. I: General Moral Theology, (Alcester: C. Goodliffe Neale, revised edition, 1993) p. 158.
||B. Haring, Free and Faithful in Christ, Vol. I: General Moral Theology, (Slough: St. Paul Publications, 1978) p. 316.
||Ibid. p. 317.
||T. Kennedy, "The Originality of John Finnis' Conception of the Natural Law", p. 128 of Vol. VII: Natural Law and Theology, Readings in Moral Theology, edited by C. E. Curran and R. McCormick (New York, Mahwah, Paulist, 1991).
||F. Bockle, "Nature as the Basis of Morality", p. 409 of Vol. VII: Natural Law and Theology, Readings in Moral Theology.
||C. E. Curran, "Natural Law and Contemporary Moral Theology" p. 159 of Contraception: Authority and Dissent, Charles E. Curran (ed), (London: Burns & Oates, 1969).
||C. E. Curran, Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology, (Notre Dame, Ind. : Fides Publishers, Inc., 1970) p. 108.
||VS no. 47.
||Antony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, (London: Pan Books Ltd 1984), p. 119: fact/value distinction; and pp. 240-241: naturalistic fallacy.
||Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Certain Problems of Sexual Ethics Personae humanae (29 December, 1975) no. 9, p. 492 of Vatican Collection Vol. II. Vatican Council II.
More Post Conciliar Documents, general editor A. Flannery, (New York: Costello Publishing Company, 1982).
||Ibid. no. 9, foonote 21, p. 499.
||HV no. 13, foonote 13 to Mater et Magistra no. 194 (according to the text).
||VS no. 47.
||VS no. 48.
||Cf. Denis J. M. Bradley, "John Finnis on Aquinas 'The Philosopher'," Heythrop Journal, Vol. 41 (1), (January, 2000) p. 13.
||Ibid. p. 1.
||Douglas Flippen, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations", New Scholasticism, 60 (Summer 1986) pp. 287, 301-302, 306, 312-313.
||Ibid. p. 306, footnote 48.
||G. Grisez, Contraception and the Natural Law, (Milwaukee, 1964) p. 60.
||G. Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2", Natural Law Forum, 10, (1965) p. 175.
||G. Grisez, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Some Comments and Clarifications", New Scholasticism, 61, (Summer 1986) pp. 307-320.
||Flippen, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations", pp. 284-316.
||ST, I-II, 94, 2.
||Cf. Flippen, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations", pp. 292 and 312; and Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2", p. 176.
||W. May, "The Natural Law and Objective Morality: A Thomistic Perspective", p. 345 of Vol. VII: Natural Law and Theology, Readings in Moral Theology.
||Ibid. p. 346.
||Grisez, Contraception and the Natural Law, p. 65.
||Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 34.
||May, An Introduction to Moral Theology p. 73.
||Ibid. p. 69: footnote 80 to Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, page 179.
||Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 37.
||G. Grisez, Joseph Boyle and John Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends", American Journal of Jurisprudence, 32 (1987) p. 102.
||Cf. Ralph McInerny, "The Principles of Natural Law", American Journal of Jurisprudence 25 (1980) p. 9.
||Veatch, "Review of Natural Law and Natural Rights by J. Finnis", p. 257.
||Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, translated from the German by R. and C. Winston, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993) p. 132.
||Ibid. p. 132. This work is translated from the German.
Is 'coercion' accurate to his sense?
I accept the point without endorsing this expression.
||HV no. 25.
||HV no. 13.
||Dignitatis Humanae no. 1.
||ST, I, 16, 1.
||This analysis is influenced by a quotation from St. Thomas Aquinas, given without a reference: '"When Nature works at the bidding of sinful instincts, God", says St. Thomas, "concurs not with sin, but with Nature".'
It was on page 72 in a book by Anscar Vonier, The Human Soul and its Relations with other Spirits, (London: B. Herder, second edition, 1920).
The reference is I, 118, 2, Reply Obj. 5.
||Andrew Beards, Philosophy: A Course Book for the B.A. Divinity Programme, (Birmingham: Maryvale Institute, 1997) pp. 70-71.
||Ibid. p. 70.
||Gaudium et Spes no. 22.
||Two investigations: does this include all men, and all states of man (eg. man in hell)?